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CanO¤shoring Reduce Unemployment?1
Devashish Mitra Priya Ranjan
Syracuse University University of California - Irvine
Abstract: In this paper, in order to study the impact of o¤shoring on sectoral and
economywide rates of unemployment, we construct a two-sector, general-equilibrium
model in which labor is mobile across the two sectors, and unemployment is caused
by search frictions. We nd that, contrary to general perception, wage increases and
sectoral unemployment decreases due to o¤shoring. This result can be understood to
arise from the productivity enhancing (cost reducing) e¤ect of o¤shoring. If the search
cost is identical in the two sectors, or is higher in the sector which experiences o¤shoring,
the economywide rate of unemployment decreases. When we modify the model to
disallow intersectoral labor mobility, the negative relative price e¤ect on the o¤shoring
sector may o¤set the positive productivity e¤ect, and result in a rise in unemployment in
that sector. In the other sector, o¤shoring has a much stronger unemployment reducing
e¤ect in this case.
1We thank seminar participants at Carleton University, Drexel University, the Indian School of Business
(Hyderabad), Oregon State University, University of Virginia and the World Bank, and conference partic-
ipants at the 2007 Globalization Conference at Kobe University in Japan, the 2008 AEA meeting in New
Orleans, the Centro Studi Luca dAgliano Conference on Outsourcing and Immigration held in Fondazione
Agnelli in Turin (Italy), the Midwest International Trade Conference in Minneapolis (Spring, 2007), and the
NBER Spring 2007 International Trade and Investment group meeting for useful comments and discussions.
We are indebted to Pol Antras (our discussant at the 2008 AEA meetings) for very detailed comments on an
earlier version. The standard disclaimer applies. Email: Devashish Mitra: dmitra@maxwell.syr.edu; Priya
Ranjan: pranjan@uci.edu
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1 Introduction
"O¤shoring" is the sourcing of inputs (goods and services) from foreign countries. When pro-
duction of these inputs moves to foreign countries, the fear at home is that jobs will be lost and
unemployment will rise. In the recent past, this has become an important political issue. The
remarks by Greg Mankiw, when he was Head of the Presidents Council of Economic Advisers,
that "outsourcing is just a new way of doing international trade" and is "a good thing" came under
sharp attack from prominent politicians from both sides of the aisle. Recent estimates by Forrester
Research of job losses due to o¤shoring equaling a total of 3.3 million white collar jobs by 2015 and
the prediction by Deloitte Research of the outsourcing of 2 million nancial sector jobs by the year
2009 have drawn a lot of attention from politicians and journalists (Drezner, 2004), even though
these job losses are only a small fraction of the total number unemployed, especially when we take
into account the fact that these losses will be spread over many years.2 Furthermore, statements
by IT executives have added fuel to this re. One such statement was made by an IBM executive
who said "[Globalization] means shifting a lot of jobs, opening a lot of locations in places we had
never dreamt of before, going where there is low-cost labor, low-cost competition, shifting jobs o¤-
shore", while another statement was made by Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorna in her testimony
before Congress that "there is no job that is Americas God-given right anymore" (Drezner, 2004).
The alarming estimates by Bardhan and Kroll (2003) and McKinsey (2005) that 11 percent of our
jobs are potentially at risk of being o¤shored have provided anti-o¤shoring politicians with more
ammunition for their position on this issue.
While the relation between o¤shoring and unemployment has been an important issue for politi-
cians, the media and the public, there has hardly been any careful theoretical analysis of this
relationship by economists. In this paper, in order to study the impact of o¤shoring on sectoral
2The average number of gross job losses per week in the US is about 500,000 (Blinder, 2006). Also see Bhagwati,
Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004) on the plausibility and magnitudes of available estimates of the unemployment
e¤ects of o¤shoring.
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and economywide rates of unemployment, we construct a two-sector, general-equilibrium model in
which unemployment is caused by search frictions a la Pissarides (2000).3 There is a single factor
of production, labor. Firms in one sector, called sector Z; use labor to produce two inputs which
are then assembled into output. The production of one of these inputs (production input) can be
o¤shored, but the other input (headquarter services) must be produced using domestic labor only.
There is another sector, X; that uses only domestic labor to produce its output. Goods Z and X
are combined to produce the consumption good C.
The main result of this paper is that in the presence of intersectoral labor mobility, o¤shoring
leads to wage increases and unemployment reductions in both sectors. Intuitively, o¤shoring reduces
the cost of production and hence the relative price of good Z because one of the inputs is o¤shored.
The resulting increase in the relative price of the non-o¤shoring sector X leads to greater job
creation and hence reduced unemployment there. The impact on unemployment in the Z sector
depends on two mutually opposing forces. A decrease in the relative price of Z would reduce job
creation there. However, the marginal product of workers engaged in headquarter activities in
the Z sector increases because each such worker works with more production input, given that
this input is now being obtained from abroad (the South) and is cheaper. The latter e¤ect would
increase job creation in headquarter activities in the Z sector. In the presence of labor mobility, the
no arbitrage condition ensures that the net e¤ect is a reduction in unemployment in the Z sector.
Since wage increases and unemployment decreases in the X sector, the same must happen in the Z
sector as well, otherwise, workers will have an incentive to move from the Z sector to the X sector,
which cannot be an equilibrium. Even though o¤shoring of the production input destroys the jobs
of workers engaged in the production of this input in the Z sector, labor mobility ensures that the
positive productivity e¤ect dominates the negative relative price e¤ect in the Z sector, resulting in
lower unemployment. Additional headquarter jobs in the Z sector and additional X-sector jobs are
created, and the number of these jobs created exceeds the number of production jobs o¤shored.
3For a comprehensive survey of the search-theoretic literature on unemployment, see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright
(2005).
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The impact of o¤shoring on overall economywide unemployment depends on how the structure
or the composition of the economy changes. Even though both sectors have lower unemployment
post-o¤shoring with intersectoral labor mobility, whether the sector with the lower unemployment
or higher unemployment expands will also be a determinant of the overall unemployment rate. If the
search cost is identical in the two sectors, implying identical rates of sectoral unemployment, then
the economywide rate of unemployment declines unambiguously after o¤shoring. Alternatively, if
the search cost is higher in the sector which experiences o¤shoring (implying a higher wage as well
as a higher rate of unemployment in that sector), then the economywide rate of unemployment also
decreases because some workers move to the other sector which has a lower unemployment rate.
In the absence of intersectoral labor mobility (this can be considered to be the shorter-run
version of the model with labor mobility), it is possible for unemployment to increase in the Z
sector which o¤shores its input, however, unemployment in the X sector must decrease. That is, it
is possible for the negative relative price e¤ect to dominate the positive productivity e¤ect in the
Z sector. Whether this will be the case or not will depend on the importance of good Z in nal
consumption and on the headquarter intensity in the production of good Z. However, since the
relative price of good X increases, there is an increase in wage and a decrease in unemployment in
the X sector. As well, since workers cannot move from Z sector to X sector, the favorable relative
price e¤ect of o¤shoring on X sector (in which production is always fully domestic) is stronger
under no labor mobility than under mobile labor. Therefore, the reduction in the unemployment
rate in the X sector (due to o¤shoring) is greater in this shorter run version of the model than in
the model with intersectoral labor mobility.
Our theoretical results are consistent with the empirical results of Amiti and Wei (2005a, b)
for the US and the UK. They nd no support for the anxietyof massive job lossesassociated
with o¤shore outsourcing from developed to developing countries.4 Using data on 78 sectors in
the UK for the period 1992-2001, they nd no evidence in support of a negative relationship
4The o¤shoring variable they use, which they call o¤shoring intensity, is dened as the share of imported inputs
(material or service) as a proportion of total nonenergy inputs used by the industry.
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between employment and outsourcing. In fact, in many of their specications the relationship is
positive. In the US case, they nd a very small, negative e¤ect of o¤shoring on employment if the
economy is decomposed into 450 narrowly dened sectors which disappears when one looks at more
broadly dened 96 sectors. Alongside this result, they also nd a positive relationship between
o¤shoring and productivity. These results are consistent with opposing e¤ects on employment (and
unemployment) created by o¤shoring. In this context , Amiti and Wei (2005a) write: On the one
hand, every job lost is a job lost. On the other hand, rms that have outsourced may become more
e¢ cient and expand employment in other lines of work. If rms relocate their relatively ine¢ cient
parts of the production process to another country, where they can be produced more cheaply,
they can expand their output in production for which they have comparative advantage. These
productivity benets can translate into lower prices generating further demand and hence create
more jobs. This job creation e¤ect could in principle o¤set job losses due to outsourcing.This
intuition is consistent with the channels in our model and the reason for obtaining a result that
shows a reduction in sectoral and overall unemployment as a result of o¤shoring.
A discussion of the related theoretical literature is useful here, as it puts in perspective the
need for our analysis. While the relationship between o¤shoring and unemployment has not been
analytically studied before by economists, there is now a vast literature on o¤shoring and outsourc-
ing.5 All the models in that literature, following the tradition in standard trade theory, assume
full employment. In spite of this assumption in the existing literature, it is important to note
that our results are similar in spirit to those in an important recent contribution by Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) where they model o¤shoring as "trading in tasks" and show that even
factors of production whose tasks are o¤shored can benet from o¤shoring due to its productivity
enhancing e¤ect. Our paper is also closely related to the fragmentation literature which analyzes
the economic e¤ects of breaking down the production process into di¤erent components, some of
which can be moved abroad.6 In this literature, the possibility of fragmentation leading to the
5See Helpman (2006) for a review of this literature.
6See for instance Arndt (1997), Jones and Kierzkowski (1990 and 2001) and Deardor¤ (2001a and b).
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equivalent of technological improvement in an industry has been shown.7
Also closely related to our work is a very recent working paper by Davidson, Matusz and
Shevchenko (2006) that uses a model of job search to study the impact of o¤shoring of high-tech
jobs on low and high-skilled workerswages, and on overall welfare. Another paper looking at the
impact of o¤shoring on the labor market is Karabay and McLaren (2006) who study the e¤ects
of free trade and o¤shore outsourcing on wage volatility and worker welfare in a model where
risk sharing takes place through employment relationships. Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan
(2004) also analyze in detail the welfare and wage e¤ects of o¤shoring.
It is also important to note that there does exist a literature on the relationship between trade
and search induced unemployment (e.g. Davidson and Matusz (2004), Moore and Ranjan (2005),
Helpman and Itskhoki (2007)). The main focus of this literature, as discussed in Davidson and
Matusz, has been the role of e¢ ciency in job search, the rate of job destruction and the rate of
job turnover in the determination of comparative advantage.8 Using an imperfectly competitive
set up, Helpman and Itskhoki look at how gains from trade and comparative advantage depend
on labor market rigidities as captured by search and ring costs and unemployment benets, and
how labor-market policies in a country a¤ect its trading partner. Moore and Ranjan, whose focus
is quite di¤erent from the rest of the literature on trade and search unemployment, show that the
impact of skill-biased technological change on unemployment can be quite di¤erent from that of
globalization. None of these models deals with o¤shoring.
7See for instance Jones and Kierzkowski (2001).
8See also the inuential and well cited paper by Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) for a careful analysis of
these relationships under very general conditions.
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2 A Model of O¤shoring and Unemployment
2.1 Preferences
All agents share the identical lifetime utility functionZ 1
t
exp r(s t)C(s)ds; (1)
where C is consumption, r is the discount rate, and s is a time index. Asset markets are complete.
The form of the utility function implies that the risk-free interest rate, in terms of consumption,
equals r.
Each worker has one unit of labor to devote to market activities at every instant of time. The
total size of the workforce is L: The nal consumption good C is produced under CRS using two
goods Z and X as inputs (or equivalently can be considered to be a composite basket of these two
goods) as follows:
C = F (Z;X) (2)
We choose the nal consumption good C as numeraire. Let Pz and Px be the prices of Z and X;
respectively. Since the price of C = 1; we get
1 = g(Pz; Px) (3)
where g is increasing in both Pz and Px: Therefore, an increase in Pz implies a decrease in Px: Also,
(2) implies that the relative demand for Z is given by
Z
X
d
= f(
Pz
Px
); f 0 < 0 (4)
2.2 Goods and labor markets
Production of good X is undertaken by perfectly competitive rms. To produce one unit of X a
rm needs to hire one unit of labor.
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Z is also produced by competitive rms, but using a slightly more sophisticated technology
involving two separate stages which are combined into the nal good. The production function for
Z is given as follows.
Z =
1
  (1  )1 m

hm
1 
p (5)
where mh is the labor input into certain core activities (say headquarter services) which have to
remain within the home country and mp is the labor input for production activities which can
potentially be o¤shored.9
If we denote the total amount of labor employed by a rm by N; then we have
N = mh +mp (6)
To produce either X or Z, a rm needs to open job vacancies and hire workers. The cost of
vacancy in terms of the numeraire good is ci in sector i = X;Z.10 Let Li be the total number of
workers who look for a job in sector i: Any job in either sector can be hit with an idiosyncratic shock
with probability  and be destroyed. Dene i = viui as the measure of market tightness in sector
i; where viLi is the total number of vacancies in sector i and uiLi is the number of unemployed
workers searching for a job in sector i. The probability of a vacancy lled is q(i) =
m(vi;ui)
vi
where
m(vi; ui) is a constant returns to scale matching function. Since m(vi; ui) is constant returns to
scale, q0(i) < 0: The probability of an unemployed worker nding a job is
m(vi;ui)
ui
= iq(i) which
is increasing in i:
9Even though we have assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function for analytical tractability, the qualitative
results will go through with a more general production function.
10The robustness of our results to alternatively dening and xing vacancy costs in terms of good Z or in terms of
labor is discussed in the penultimate section of this paper.
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2.3 Prot maximization by rms in the Z sector
Denote the number of vacancies posted by a rm in the Z sector by V: Assuming that each rm
is large enough to employ and hire enough workers to resolve the uncertainty of job inows and
outows, the dynamics of employment for a rm is
:
N(t) = q(z(t))V (t)  N(t) (7)
The wage for each worker is determined by a process of Nash bargaining with the rm separately
which (along with alternative modes of bargaining, including multilateral bargaining) is discussed
later. While deciding on how many vacancies to open up the rm correctly anticipates this wage.
E¤ectively, the rm solves a two stage problem where in stage 1 it chooses vacancies and in stage
2 it enters into bargaining with workers to determine wages.11 Therefore, the prot maximization
problem for an individual rm can be written as
Max
V (s);mh(s);mp(s)
Z 1
t
e r(s t) fPz(s)Z(s)  wz(s)N(s)  czV (s)g ds (8)
The rm maximizes (8) subject to (5), (6), and (7). We provide details of the rms maximization
exercise in the appendix. Since we are going to study only the steady state in this paper, we
suppress the time index hereafter. The steady-state is characterized by
:
N(t) = 0: From the rst-
order conditions of the rms maximization problem, the optimal mix of headquarter and production
labor is given by
mh
mp
=

1   (9)
11As shown by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), the subgame perfect equilibrium of this type of set up can possibly
involve a choice of employment greater than what a wage taking rm would do. This is because by choosing higher
employment in stage 1 a rm can lower the marginal product of a worker and thus reduce the wage it has to pay in
the second stage. As we will see shortly for the autarky case (and later for the o¤shoring case), the value of marginal
product of labor in our set up will be constant for a given Pz, and therefore, a rm has no such strategic motive.
Hence, the second stage wage is e¤ectively independent of the rst stage employment choice (see Cahuc and Wasmer
(2001) for a formal proof).
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which in turn makes the output e¤ectively linear in the total employment of the rm as follows:
Z = N (10)
The key equation from the rms optimal choice of vacancy, derived in the appendix, is given by
Pz   wz
(r + )
=
cz
q(z)
(11)
The expression on the left-hand side is the marginal benet from a job which equals the present
value of the stream of the marginal revenue product net of wage of an extra worker after factoring
in the probability of job separation each period. The right-hand side expression is the marginal
cost of a job which equals the cost of posting a vacancy, cz; multiplied by the average duration of
a vacancy, 1q(z) . Alternatively,
1
q(z)
is the average number of vacancies required to be posted to
create a job per unit of time. (11) yields the asset value of an extra job for a rm which will be
useful in the wage determination below. An alternative way to write (11) is
Pz = wz +
(r + )cz
q(z)
(12)
This is the modied pricing equation in the presence of search frictions where in addition to the
standard wage cost, expected search cost is added to the marginal cost of producing a unit of
output.
Denoting the rate of unemployment in the Z sector by uz; in steady-state the ow into unem-
ployment must equal the ow out of unemployment:
(1  uz) = zq(z)uz
The above implies
uz =

 + zq(z)
(13)
The above is the standard Beveridge curve in Pissarides type search models where the rate of
unemployment is positively related to the probability of job destruction, ; and negatively related
to the degree market tightness z:
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As mentioned earlier, rms in X sector use one unit of labor to produce one unit of output, and
therefore, following an exercise similar to that in Z sector, we obtain the analogues of equations
(12) and (13) for the X sector.
2.4 Wage Determination
Wage is determined for each worker through a process of Nash bargaining with his/her employer.
Workers bargain individually and simultaneously with the rm.12 Rotemberg (2006) justies this
assumption by viewing it as a situation where each worker bargains with a separate representative
of the rm. Thus each worker and the representative that he bargains with assume at the time of
bargaining that the rm will reach a set of agreements with the other workers that leads these to
remain employed.
Denoting the unemployment benet in terms of the nal good by b, it is shown in the appendix
that the expression for wage is the same as in a standard Pissarides model and is given by
wi = b+
ci
1   [i +
r + 
q(i)
]; i = x; z (14)
The above wage equation along with the (12) and (13) derived earlier, which we gather below, are
the three key equations determining wi; i; and ui for a given Pi:
Pi = wi +
(r + )ci
q(i)
; i = x; z (15)
ui =

 + iq(i)
; i = x; z (16)
For each of the two sectors, for a given price we can determine the wage, wi and the market
tightness, i as follows. Equation (14) represents the wage curve, WC which is clearly upward
12As shown by Stole and Zweibel (1996), the outcome of this wage bargaining is similar to the Shapley value of
a worker obtained under multilateral bargaining. It is shown in the appendix that the Shapley value of a worker is
exactly the same as the wage rate obtained from Nash bargaining when  = 1=2: See Helpman and Itskhoki (2007)
and Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman (2007) for recent uses of multilateral Shapley bargaining. Also, a model of
collective bargaining would leave everything unchanged in our paper.
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sloping in the (w; ) space in Figure 1. The greater is the labor market tightness, the higher is the
wage that emerges out of the bargaining process (as the greater is going to be the value of each
occupied job). Note that the position of this curve is independent of the price, Pi: Equation (15)
is the pricing equation. As explained in Pissarides (2000), it also represents the job creation curve,
as it equates the value of the marginal product of labor, Pi; to the wage, wi plus the expected
capitalized value of the rms hiring cost, (r+)ciq(i) : This is the marginal condition in the creation
of the last job. For a given price, as shown in Figure 1, the job creation curve, represented by
JC is downward sloping in the (w; ) space. The capitalized value of the hiring cost is increasing
in market tightness, i: Therefore, for a given value of the marginal product of labor, there is a
tradeo¤ between the wage and the market tightness. The intersection of WC and JC gives the
partial equilibrium levels of wi and i for a given Pi. As the price, Pi; increases, JC shifts up, leading
to an increase in wi and i; and thus from the Beveridge curve a reduction in unemployment.
2.5 No arbitrage condition
Since unemployed workers can search in either sector, the income of the unemployed must be the
same from searching in either sector. As shown in equation (32) in appendix, the income of the
unemployed searching in sector-i is given by rUi = b+

1  cii: Perfect labor mobility implies the
no arbitrage condition of Uz = Ux, which in turn, implies
czz = cxx (17)
That is, the labor market tightness for each sector is inversely proportional to its vacancy cost.
Next, it can be veried from the wage equation in (14) that when czz = cxx wage is higher in
the sector having a lower market tightness. Thus the unemployment rate as well as the wage rate
will be higher in the sector with the higher search cost.
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2.6 Autarky Equilibrium
We solve for the equilibrium value of the relative price, PzPx ; which in turn will give us the equilibrium
values of wages and unemployments in the two sectors in autarky.
Note from (3) that an increase in Pz requires a decrease in Px to keep the price of numeraire at
1. This represents the zero prot condition (ZPC) for the numeraire sector, C, and is represented
by a downward sloping line denoted by ZPC in Figure 2a.
Next, using the no arbitrage condition (17) we obtain a positive relationship between Px and Pz
as follows. Starting from any Px; we can determine wx and x from the intersection of WC and JC
for sector X. Next, z is determined from the no arbitrage condition (17). Then wz is determined
from (14). Since we know z and wz; we can determine Pz from (15), which means the position of
the curve JC for this sector should be such that it passes through the (wz; z) we just determined.
The price, Pz; being a determinant of the position of JC will adjust to make this happen.
As Px goes up, JC in the X sector shifts up, leading to an increase in wx and x and, through
the mechanism outlined above, an increase in wz; z and Pz. A higher price of a sectors output
implies higher value of marginal product of a worker in that sector and therefore a higher present
value of the income stream of an unemployed worker searching in that sector. Since these incomes
of the unemployed need to be equalized across the two sectors, a higher price in one sector implies
a higher price in the other. This positive relationship between Px and Pz due to the no arbitrage
condition is called NAC(A) in Figure 2a, where A denotes autarky.
The two relationships between Px and Pz; NAC and ZPC in Figure 2a, uniquely determine the
general equilibrium values of Px and Pz: Once we know Px and Pz we obtain the general equilibrium
values of wi; i; and ui; using (14)-(16), through the WC-JC apparatus described above (Figure
1).
Notice the Ricardian element in the model in that the relative supply of Z is a horizontal line
at the PzPx determined by the intersection of NAC and ZPC curves described above. The relative
demand for Z given in (4) is downward sloping and is represented by the RD curve in Figure 2b.
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The horizontal RS curve (at the price determined by NAC and ZPC curves in Figure 2a) is the
relative supply curve. The intersection of the two curves determines the general equilibrium ZX .
2.7 Equilibrium with the possibility of o¤shoring
Now, suppose rms in the Z sector have the option of procuring input mp from abroad instead
of producing them domestically.13 The per unit cost of imported input is ws in terms of the
numeraire good C, and this country takes this per unit cost as given:14 This includes transportation
cost, tari¤s, foreign wage costs and possible search costs, all of which, for analytical tractability, we
assume to be proportional to the amount of the input imported. If and when o¤shoring takes place,
the nal good C will be exported to pay for the imports of mp: For a rm o¤shoring its production
input, the production function specied in (5) can be written as Z = 1
 (1 )1 N
m1 p , where N
is the domestic labor used for headquarter services. This rm maximizes
R1
t e
 r(s t)fPz(s)Z(s) 
wz(s)N(s)   wsmp(s)   czV (s)gds: The equation of motion for employment given in (7) remains
valid.15
With each rm taking the equilibrium z as given, in steady state, we get
N
mp
=
ws
(1  )

wz +
(r+)cz
q(z)
 (18)
13The assumption here is that one unit of home (domestic) labor can produce one unit of the production input.
Therefore, we use mp to denote both the number of units of the imported input in the o¤shoring case as well as the
number of units of production labor in the autarky case.
14The assumption that ws is xed is e¤ectively a small country assumption. However, as argued in the section on
possible extensions, there is no loss of generality resulting from it. One can also easily work out the implications for
the country from which the input is being imported.
15As in the autarky case, there is no role for strategic overemployment here as well. The marginal product of
headquarter labor in Z gets xed for a given Pz as follows: ws is equated to the value of marginal product of
production input. Under CRS, this xes the ratio of headquarter to production input for a given Pz, which in turn
xes the marginal product of headquarter labor.
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The price equals marginal cost condition is given by
Pz = w
1 
s

wz +
(r + )cz
q(z)

(19)
Since the value of a domestic job still equals czq(z) in steady-state; the wage is still given by
wz = b+
cz
1   [z +
r + 
q(z)
] (20)
In the rest of this section we use the following notational simplication.
Denition 1: !  wz+
(r+)cz
q(z)
ws
In the above denition ! is the cost of domestic labor relative to foreign labor. It is clear that
in order for rms to o¤shore we require ! > 1:16
We can determine the o¤shoring equilibrium in sector Z using the WC-JC apparatus in Figure
1 as follows. Notice that (19) represents the new job creation curve in the Z sector as it can be
written as Pz!1  =

wz +
(r+)cz
q(z)

: After o¤shoring, the new value of the marginal product is
Pz!
1  which, for a given Pz; is greater than the value of the marginal product, Pz under autarky
(as ! > 1):17 Thus, for a given Pz; we can represent sector Zs new job creation curve in Figure 1
by JCwhich is to the right of the autarky job creation curve which we represent by JC. The wage
bargaining curve remains at WC. The intersection between JCand WC shows us that the partial
16 It is possible that the value of ! is less than 1 under autarky and greater than 1 when all rms o¤shore, resulting
in the possibility of multiple equilibria - autarky and o¤shoring. However, starting from autarky, in such a case
rms will be faced with a coordination problem that will prevent them from moving into an o¤shoring equilibrium.
Therefore, for our analysis, for o¤shoring to take place it will be required that ! > 1 under autarky, which will imply
that ! > 1 also once o¤shoring has taken place. As shown in the subsection on comparative static exercises, the value
of ! depends on parameters of the model such as ; b; ci and the e¢ ciency of matching. It also depends on ws which
is taken as given. In other words, there are several degrees of freedom to make sure that the restriction ! > 1 holds.
17Since ws is equated to the value of the marginal product of production input, the ratio of headquarter to
production input gets completely pinned down by ws and Pz. This ratio of headquarter to production input in turn
completely pins down ! (see equation 18). Thus, ! gets xed by ws and Pz:
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equilibrium e¤ect (under constant Pz) of o¤shoring is an unambiguous increase in both wz and z
(which leads to a reduction in uz):
We next derive the general equilibrium e¤ects of o¤shoring. Start with a given Px: The partial
equilibrium for the X sector remain unaltered relative to the partial equilibrium under autarky.
Thus, wx and x remain the same, and also wz and z remain unaltered from the no arbitrage
condition (17) and the unaltered wage curve of the Z sector. The corresponding Pz is obtained
from the new pricing equation (19). As well, as in the case of autarky, an increase in Px implies
an increase in Pz: What is di¤erent is that (19) implies that Pz must be lower than under autarky
for each level of Px. Thus, the upward sloping no arbitrage condition under o¤shoring lies below
the the one under autarky and is denoted by NAC(O) in Figure 2a. The zero prot condition for
the nal good Px given in (3), which for obvious reasons is unaltered and is denoted by ZPC in
Figure 2a. The equilibrium levels of Px and Pz are obtained by the intersection of NAC(O) and
ZPC. It is clear that Px is higher and Pz is lower in the o¤shoring equilibrium compared to the
no o¤shoring case.
In an o¤shoring equilibrium Px is higher, which means, from the WC-JC diagram for the X
sector, that wx and x are higher, which in turn from the no arbitrage condition and the unaltered
wage curve for the Z sector, implies that wz and z are also higher. Since x and z are higher, both
ux and uz are lower than in the no-o¤shoring equilibrium, i.e., the rates of unemployment in both
sectors decrease. An increase in the price of good X is able to support higher labor costs in that
sector. Since the wage curve implies that wage and market tightness increase together, we have
an increase in both these variables in the X sector. Unemployment goes down as a result. Market
tightness in the X and Z sectors go together, and so we get a reduction in Z sector unemployment
rate as well. In terms of the WC-JC apparatus illustrated in Figure 1, in sector Z we have the
new JC curve, denoted by JC", which is below JCbut above JC since the reduction in Pz has
been less than the vertical distance between NAC(A) and NAC(O). The move from JC to JC
represents a pure, partial equilibrium productivity e¤ect on wz and z and this e¤ect on these two
variables is positive. The move from JCto JC" is a general equilibrium, relative price e¤ect and is
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negative. This negative general-equilibrium e¤ect cannot dominate the positive partial equilibrium
e¤ect due to the no-arbitrage condition.
Another way to understand the above result is as follows. An increase in Px implies an increase
in the value of a job in the X sector relative to the cost of vacancy. Therefore, there is greater
job creation there and hence a decrease in unemployment. In the Z sector there are two opposing
forces on the value of a job. While o¤shoring increases the productivity of the sector, thereby
raising the value of a domestic job (for headquarter services) at unchanged prices, the price of good
Z goes down rendering the net impact ambiguous. In fact, this is what happens when workers
cannot move from Z sector to the X sector as we discuss in detail later. When workers can move,
however, the productivity e¤ect must dominate the relative price e¤ect, leading to an increase the
value of a domestic job in the Z sector as well. Here is why. Suppose the value of a job in the Z
sector decreased. This would mean a rise in unemployment and a fall in the wage in Z sector. We
know that the value of a job in sector X has increased. Since workers are mobile, more unemployed
workers will look for a job in the X sector. That is, the number of workers a¢ liated with sector
Z; Lz; will decrease and the number of workers a¢ liated with sector X; Lx; will increase. This
will go on until the value of looking for a job in either sector is equalized. This can happen only if
z =
cxx
cz
. Therefore, if x rises z must rise as well.
The impact on the economywide unemployment depends on the relative search costs in the two
sectors.
Case I: In the special case of cx = cz, we have x = z and hence ux = uz: Therefore, aggregate
unemployment falls along with the fall in sectoral unemployment due to o¤shoring.
When cx 6= cz; we have x 6= z, and therefore, the two sectors have di¤erent unemployment
rates. Now, the impact of o¤shoring on economywide unemployment depends on the direction of
labor movement, that is whether labor moves to the high unemployment sector or low unemploy-
ment sector. When cx = cz; and the production function for the nal good, C; is Cobb-Douglas,
it is easy to show that the size of the labor force in the Z sector post-o¤shoring is less than in
the pre-o¤shoring equilibrium (See proof in appendix). Even though the result above obtains for
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cx = cz; using a continuity argument we can say that it will hold if cx and cz are not too di¤erent.
Numerical simulations conrm that the result on Lz decreasing upon o¤shoring is valid even when
cx 6= cz (cx and cz are fairly far apart): In this case we get the following additional results.
Case II: cx < cz: In this case, it is easy to verify that x > z, and hence ux < uz: That
is, Z sector has a higher wage as well as unemployment. Now, since o¤shoring shifts labor from
sector Z to sector X; there is going to be an unambiguous decrease in aggregate unemployment.
Although the wages of workers in both sectors increase, the number of workers earning the higher
wage declines.
Case III: cx > cz: In this case, even though the rate of unemployment decreases in both sectors,
since labor moves into the sector with higher unemployment the impact on aggregate unemployment
is ambiguous.
The comparison of the o¤shoring and autarky equilibria can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 In an o¤shoring equilibrium, sectoral wages are higher and sectoral unemployment
rates lower than in the autarky equilibrium. When cx  cz; there is an unambiguous decrease in
aggregate unemployment as a result of moving from autarky to an o¤shoring equilibrium. When
cx > cz; the impact on aggregate unemployment is ambiguous.
2.8 Intrasectoral versus intersectoral labor reallocation
In this model, there is labor mobility across the two sectors, X and Z and across the two types
of jobs, production and headquarter activity in sector Z. This leads to the possibility of intra-
sectoral labor reallocation between the two types of jobs and intersectoral labor reallocation once
the economy moves from autarky to o¤shoring. As shown in the appendix, when cx = cz and the
production function for C is Cobb-Douglas with the share of intermediate good Z being ; the
labor force in the Z sector under autarky is LAz = L: Once o¤shoring has taken place, this falls to
LOz =

1 +L: In other words, the contraction in the labor force of the Z sector (or the expansion
in the labor force of the X sector) equals LAz   LOz =
(1 )(1 )
(1 +) L; which is decreasing in the
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headquarter intensity,  : This is intuitive since a high headquarter intensity means that most of
the labor force is employed in headquarter activity to begin with and production activities form
a small fraction of jobs in the Z sector, thus allowing the scope for very little intersectoral labor
reallocation upon o¤shoring.
We next look at intrasectoral reallocation. The number of jobs in headquarter activity under
autarky equals mAh = (1   uA)L; while the number of headquarter jobs increases to mOh =
(1   uO) 1 +L: It is easy to verify that m
O
h > m
A
h . Thus, some of the production jobs lost in
the Z sector can be made up by expansion in the number of headquarter jobs. Together with the
expansion in the number of jobs in the X sector, this more than makes up for the number of jobs
o¤shored, and leads to a fall in the unemployment rate.
3 The Case of No Intersectoral Labor Mobility
Since the transitional dynamics of the model are very complicated, to study the shorter run im-
plications of o¤shoring on unemployment, we discuss a case where there is no intersectoral labor
mobility, that is Lx and Lz are held xed. The only connection between the two sectors is through
goods prices.
Let us start with the determination of autarky equilibrium without labor mobility. Note that
the ZPC curve in Figure 2a is still valid but the NAC curve representing the no arbitrage condition
doesnt hold. Therefore, the relative price PzPx is now determined by the relative supply and relative
demand. To derive the relative supply curve, note that an in increase PzPx implies an increase in Pz
and a decrease in Px from ZPC. An increase in Pi implies increases in wi and i from Figure 1a
and a fall in ui. Therefore, an increase in PzPx implies an increase in
Z
X (=
(1 uz)Lz
(1 ux)Lx ). Let us call this
relationship, the short-run relative supply curve, and the horizontal relative supply curve we derived
earlier, shown in Figure 2b, the long-run relative supply curve. At Lx = LAx and Lz = L
A
z (where
LAi represents labor force in sector i = x; z; in an autarky equilibrium when labor is mobile across
sectors) it is easy to see that both the long-run and the short-run curves cut the relative demand
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curve at exactly the same point A (See Figure 3 where SRSA(LAz ) stands for short-run relative
supply in the autarky case at the long-run autarkic intersectoral allocation of labor, Lz = LAz and
Lx = L  LAz ).
Let us now derive the o¤shoring equilibrium under no labor mobility. The derivation of the
short run supply curve in the case of o¤shoring is similar to that in the autarky case discussed
above, the only di¤erence is that equation (15) is replaced by (19). Therefore, the short-run supply
curve under o¤shoring is again upward sloping. Next, we show in the appendix that the short run
supply curve under o¤shoring represented by SRSO(LAz ) in Figure 3 lies to the right of the short
run supply curve under autarky, SRSA(LAz ). The short run o¤shoring equilibrium is at point C in
Figure 3 where the equilibrium relative price, pOsr, is lower compared to the autarky equilibrium at
A.
Since the Px increases upon o¤shoring, the wage increases and the unemployment decreases
in the X sector. What happens to unemployment in the Z sector in the short run equilibrium is
ambiguous, however, because the no arbitrage condition does not hold anymore. The impact on Z
sector depends on the relative strengths of the productivity and relative price e¤ects. Due to the
inability of workers to move, the negative relative price e¤ect is much stronger compared to the
labor mobility case making it possible for the unemployment to rise. When the production function
for C is Cobb-Douglas with the exponent of intermediate good Z being ; the result depends on
parameters  and  . The higher the  the weaker the negative price e¤ect while the higher the  the
stronger the productivity e¤ect. Alternatively, a high  can be viewed as implying a high demand
for Z sector output and consequently a high derived demand for labor in the Z sector, while a high
 implies a high demand for headquarter services which uses domestic labor. Therefore, with a high
 or  ; a larger amount of labor can be absorbed in the Z sector without a rise in unemployment:
Next, we compare the o¤shoring equilibria with and without labor mobility as follows. It was
shown in the appendix that when cx = cz; we have LOz < L
A
z ; that is labor moves out of the Z
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sector as a consequence of o¤shoring in the presence of labor mobility.18 In the no labor mobility
case, note from (37) in the appendix giving the relative supply of Z that, holding the economys
aggregate labor force constant, decreasing Lz shifts the short-run relative supply curve in the case
of o¤shoring to the left. Therefore, the short run o¤shoring relative supply curve with Lz = LOz
lies to the left of the short-run o¤shoring supply curve with Lz = LAz . The curve representing the
short run o¤shoring supply with Lz = LOz is denoted by SRS
O(LOz ) in Figure 3. The intersection
of SRSO(LOz ) with the relative demand curve at point B captures the o¤shoring equilibrium with
labor mobility. Thus, the o¤shoring equilibrium relative price in the case of no labor mobility
corresponding to point C in Figure 3 is lower than the relative price that obtains in the case of
labor mobility corresponding to point B. Therefore, in the absence of labor mobility, o¤shoring
leads to a lower wage and a higher unemployment in the Z sector compared to the case with full
labor mobility. Also the favorable relative price e¤ect of o¤shoring for the X sector is stronger
under no labor mobility than under mobile labor. Therefore, the reduction in the unemployment
rate in the X sector (due to o¤shoring) is greater in the short-run than in the long run. This means
that unemployment in sector X falls by a considerable amount in the short run and then rises
in the long run, with the new long run unemployment rate being lower than the initial long-run
unemployment rate. Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the shorter run case where intersectoral labor mobility is not allowed, in an
o¤shoring equilibrium, the reduction in the relative price of Z is greater than what obtains under
intersectoral labor mobility. Thus, the increase in wage and the reduction in sectoral unemployment
in sector Z under o¤shoring are smaller under no labor mobility than under intersectoral labor
mobility, with the possibility being there that sectoral unemployment goes up as a result. In the X
sector, the increase in wage and the reduction in sectoral unemployment as a result of o¤shoring
are greater.
The model without intersectoral mobility of labor can also be used to analyze the impact of
18As discussed earlier, numerical simulations conrm that LOz < L
NO
z ; even when cx 6= cz:
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o¤shoring on di¤erent skill types. For example, if skilled jobs are being o¤shored, we can label
workers employed in the Z sector as skilled and workers employed in the X sector as unskilled.
The model would predict that o¤shoring would reduce the unemployment of unskilled workers and
have an ambiguous impact on the unemployment of skilled workers.
4 Some Comparative Static Exercises
While the focus of this paper is to understand the implications of o¤shoring for unemployment, we
can also use the model to understand how labor market institutions a¤ect o¤shoring and conse-
quently unemployment. To this end, we rst study the impact of an increase in the unemployment
benet, b; on o¤shoring and unemployment. We will also look at the impact of a change in the
bargaining power  and the change in search costs.
Under autarky, when b goes up, we show in the appendix, using a Cobb-Douglas matching
function and imposing the intersectoral labor mobility condition, that Pz   Px goes up or down or
remains constant as the intersectoral di¤erential in the search cost per worker (which is proportional
to czq(z)  
cx
q(x)
) goes up or down or remains constant. For a given price, an increase in b shifts the
wage curve up in each sector and its point of intersection with JC shifts to the left, leading to a
higher wage but a lower labor market tightness (that leads to a higher rate of unemployment). The
lower market tightness increases q() and thus reduces the search cost per worker. The search cost
per worker is higher in the sector that has the higher cost of posting a vacancy and as shown in the
appendix, that is also the sector that has a bigger decline in the search cost per worker as a result of
an increase in the unemployment benet, b:19 Therefore, when b goes up, the NAC curve shifts up
19The intuition is that with the labor mobility condition czz = cxx, the percentage change in the labor-market
tightness is the same in both sectors. With the Cobb-Douglas matching function implying a constant elasticity of the
probability of lling a vacancy (and of the expected number of vacancies to be posted to be able to hire a worker)
with respect to labor market tightness, we get the same percentage change in both sectors in the number of job
postings per worker employed and therefore, the same percentage change in the search expenditure per worker. As
a result, we get a bigger absolute change in search expenditure per worker in the sector with a higher initial search
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(and equilibrium Pz goes up) when cz < cx , the NAC curve shifts down (and Pz goes down) when
cz > cx; and everything remains unchanged when cz = cx: O¤shoring takes place when autarky Pz
=wz +
(r+)cz
q(z)
is greater than ws: Thus parameter changes that lead to an increase (decrease) in
this Pz make o¤shoring likely (unlikely).
Of the three cases, the ranking of vacancy costs that seems most realistic is cz > cx; as Z is
the more sophisticated sector, with labor performing two di¤erent kinds of tasks. In this case, an
increase in the unemployment benet makes o¤shoring less likely because the cost of domestic labor
in sector Z decreases with b. The intuition here is as follows. As we have seen, an increase in b
has two e¤ects on the wage and the cost of production. One is the direct e¤ect of increasing the
wage, since the term b appears in the wage equation. The other is the indirect e¤ect that takes
place by reducing market tightness which also reduces the search cost per worker, ciq(i) ; thereby
putting downward pressure on the wage and the cost of production. When cz > cx; the search
cost per worker (in the overall cost per worker employed) is relatively more important in sector
Z as compared to sector X: Thus, we have a reduction in the equilibrium relative price of Z and
therefore in its domestic average labor cost of production (inclusive of search), which reduces the
likelihood of o¤shoring.20
We obtain similar results with an increase in the bargaining power of workers, . Furthermore,
an increase in search cost in sector Z; cz; clearly shifts the NAC curve up and increases the
likelihood of o¤shoring. If an increase in cz leads to o¤shoring, it will cause a downward jump in
sectoral unemployment.
Another parameter of interest is the job destruction rate, . It is straightforward to see from the
equation, Pz = Px+
(r+)
1 

cz
q(z)
  cxq(x)

that NAC shifts up as a result of an increase in  when
expenditure per worker.
20Here, if we take the e¤ect of b on o¤shoring into account we can get a discontinuous e¤ect of b on the sectoral
unemployment rate. For example, with lower and lower values of b; unemployment keeps falling in autarky until we
cross a lower threshold b and we get o¤shoring, at which point unemployment jumps further down discontinuosly. In
the opposite case of cz < cx, we get both non-monotonocity and discontinuity in this relationship.
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cz > cx; making o¤shoring more likely. This is so since an increase in  raises the importance of
the search component relative to the direct production component in activities of the rm, and this
e¤ect is greater in the sector that has larger vacancy costs to start with.21 We can also look at the
e¤ects of exogenous increases in q() (brought about by an improvement in matching technology):
As a result of this change, (r+)q() goes down in the same proportion in both sectors, making o¤shoring
less likely when cz > cx; and more likely when cz < cx: The reason here is that a more e¢ cient
matching technology reduces the importance of search in the overall functioning of the rm and
this e¤ect is greater in the sector that has larger vacancy costs to start with. It is now very easy
to nd a worker.
Thus we nd that the e¤ect of an increase in labor market frictions or rigidities on o¤shoring
depends on the nature of the friction or rigidity being considered as well as the relative size of the
vacancy costs in the two sectors. Under the more likely case that cz > cx, o¤shoring becomes more
likely with a reduction in the unemployment benets, the bargaining power of workers and e¢ ciency
in matching and an increase in the vacancy cost in sector Z and the common job destruction rate
across the two sectors.
5 Possible Extensions and Discussion
We have presented two models in this paper with di¤erent assumptions on intersectoral labor
mobility. However, these two possibilities do not exhaust all possible combinations of assumptions
on inter and intrasectoral labor mobility. One can imagine a situation where there is no mobility
across the two types of jobs in the Z sector and but there is mobility of production labor between the
two sectors, i.e., headquarter jobs require skilled workers, while production jobs require unskilled
21This is important in the context of the ndings of Davis (2008) who provides evidence that the risk of job
destruction has gone down over the last 30 years. Thus, while other factors such as lower production costs in the
South (relative to those in the North), lower trade costs (transport costs and tari¤s) etc may have led to greater
o¤shoring in recent times, the reduction in the job destruction rate might have moderated their e¤ects.
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or relatively less skilled workers. In other words, there are two types of labor in the economy. After
o¤shoring, the production input cost in sector Z equals ws; and all the domestic production labor
moves to sector X. At a constant Pz; the marginal product of headquarter labor rises since the
cost of production input (now all imported) in sector Z falls to ws; which when equated to its
value of marginal product at a constant product price implies a higher ratio of production input to
headquarter labor, in turn implying a higher marginal product of headquarter labor. This is the
partial equilibrium e¤ect by which the JC curve for headquarter labor shifts up (and that for labor
in sector X remains xed). Thus, upon o¤shoring, at a constant Px (and therefore at constant
Pz); unemployment falls for skilled workers who work in the headquarter activities in the Z sector,
while it remains constant in sector X. Therefore, more headquarter labor is employed in sector Z.
In addition, since the ratio of production input to headquarter labor has gone up, employment of
production input (now all imported) has also gone up. Hence, we get an increase in the output
of Z at any given price. The output of X at a given price and for given X-sector labor force will
remain constant. However, the X-sector labor force actually increases upon o¤shoring since all the
domestic production labor from Z actually ows into X. Thus, both the outputs of X and Z go
up for a given Px and whether the relative supply Z=X goes up or down as a result of o¤shoring
will depend on parameters of the model. Assuming that the vacancy cost of production labor is
the same in both sectors, if the nal good C is highly intensive in Z, a large part of the domestic
production labor force will be employed in sector Z under autarky, and for given relative prices of
Z and X, we will get a very large increase in the X-sector labor force upon o¤shoring. Conversely,
with a low Z-intensity of C, we will get only a small increase in the X-sector labor force upon
o¤shoring (again for given relative prices). The Z-intensity of C does not a¤ect the post-o¤shoring
output of Z as long as Pz is constant: On the other hand, if ws is very low, we get a large increase
in the output of Z upon o¤shoring. Thus, with low Z-intensity of C and a low ws, the relative
supply of Z shifts to the right upon o¤shoring, and as in the previous two models, equilibrium Pz
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falls and Px rises upon o¤shoring.22 While this results in a positive e¤ect on the JC curve for
X-sector labor, it results in a negative general equilibrium e¤ect on the JC curve for headquarter
labor. If the direct productivity e¤ect dominates this negative e¤ect, unemployment of headquarter
labor can still go down. In any event, production labor (all in sector X now) unemployment goes
down. On the other hand, with high Z-intensity of C and a relatively high ws (but low enough
to result in o¤shoring); the relative supply of Z shifts to the left and equilibrium Pz rises and Px
falls upon o¤shoring. In this case, the general equilibrium e¤ect for headquarter labor in sector Z
is positive, and it is negative in sector X. Thus, in this case unemployment of headquarter labor
falls unambiguously and that of production labor rises unambiguously.23 The general result from
the two cases is that upon o¤shoring, unemployment cannot rise at the same time for both types of
labor, but can fall for both. At least, one type of labor will experience a fall in its unemployment
rate.
We next focus on the modeling of vacancy cost in this paper. We have modeled vacancy cost, c;
in terms of the numeraire good which seemed natural given the two sector structure of the model.
One could alternatively model the vacancy cost either in terms of labor or foregone output. In the
former case, the vacancy cost would be ciwi for sector i = X;Z; where wi is the sectoral wage.
In the latter case, it would be cipi: We nd that, under fairly plausible and reasonable conditions,
the qualitative results would be unchanged. The key to obtaining our result on unemployment is
that productivity changes should not be fully absorbed by wage changes, which will obtain with
alternative specications of search costs as well.
The third possible line along which we can extend our theory is to explicitly bring in the country
22The derivation of these results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
23 In this case of high Z-intensity of C and a relatively high ws, there is the possibility of an interior (mixed)
equilibrium, where simultaneously some amount of domestic production labor is used in the Z sector and some
amount of o¤shoring takes place. In this case, the domestic labor cost (including the cost of search) gets equated to
ws: The impact on the unemployment of the two di¤erent types of labor is qualitatively the same as what we have
seen in the complete o¤shoring equilibrium of this case (high Z-intensity of C and a relatively high ws).
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to which we o¤shore the manufacturing of the production input in sector Z: Let us here stick to the
assumption of intersectoral and intrasectoral mobility. We call here the country whose production
jobs are being o¤shored the North and the country to which these jobs are being o¤shored the
South. Let us assume that the consumption good C is the only good produced in the South but
using a small scale, Ricardian (CRS) production technology, in which every rm uses one worker
at a very low level of productivity. Unlike the North, the production of C does not take place in
multiple stages but in a single stage using only labor.24 Due to the low productivity there, the JC
curve (for C in the South) in the JC-WC diagram will be at a very low level (closer to the origin)
resulting in a low wage and low labor-market tightness (high unemployment). Upon o¤shoring, the
South starts producing the production input for the North.25 As long as both this production input
and C are produced in the South, the price of the input remains xed by the following argument.
The price of C is xed at one (numeraire good in both countries) which xes  in the C sector in the
South and, in turn by the labor mobility condition, xes  in the production input sector. This in
turn xes the wage and the price in the input sector in the South. So the production input supply
curve of the South is horizontal as long as production is diversied. If a higher price is o¤ered
for it, there is going to be complete specialization in the production of the production input, from
which point the supply curve will be upward sloping. Beyond this point, unemployment will keep
decreasing as price of the input increases. Realistically speaking, we should not expect complete
specialization in the production of input in the South, and so we can expect the North to face
a constant price of the input. All our earlier results then remain intact for the North. Southern
unemployment rate will actually go up as a result of o¤shoring when the vacancy cost there is
higher in the input sector than in C production (which would be a reasonable assumption to make
if the input sector is more sophisticated). Qualitatively, this becomes quite similar to a Lewis and a
Harris-Todaro type scenario in the South in that the labor costs are being xed by the huge relative
24The cost of not being able to (or not having access to) the roundabout method of producing C is low productivity.
25One can here think of o¤shoring as also leading to a transfer (to the South) of the know-how of manufacturing
the production input.
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size of the rest of the economy. We can also look at the unrealistic, theoretical case of complete
specialization in the input. In this case, the price would be higher than the at part of the supply
curve but for o¤shoring to take place, has to be lower than the cost of production of the input in
the North. In this case, it is possible for the Southern unemployment rate to go down.26The results
for the North remain as before.
The model in the paper can be extended along several other dimensions. In our current paper
we do not explicitly model outsourcing, as is currently understood to be subject to contracting
problems.27 If rms have the choice to outsource their production activities to a foreign supplier in
an incomplete contract framework, whether a rm outsources or produces inputs domestically will
depend on the tradeo¤ between the domestic labor market frictions and contracting costs. One can
also extend the model to include the search cost of hiring workers o¤shore.
Another possible extension would be to endogenize the bargaining power of workers in the
wage bargaining process. In our current model, wages increase with o¤shoring, however, there is
some evidence to suggest that wages of workers have stagnated despite productivity gains coming
from globalization and technological progress. If we make workersbargaining power a decreasing
function of the number of rms o¤shoring, it would be possible to show a decrease in wages resulting
from o¤shoring. This would be similar in spirit to the Mitchell (1985) description of norm shiftin
wage determination. Since our focus in the present paper is on unemployment e¤ects of o¤shoring,
we do not pursue this extension in the present paper. We plan to pursue these extensions in a
separate paper, as they seem to be beyond the scope of the current one.
26 It is possible for the Southern supply curve of the production input to start sloping up much before complete
specialization if only a fraction (less than one) of the labor force is competent in input production in the South,
while everyone there is equally competent in the low-productivity, small-scale production of the consumption good.
O¤shoring then can possibly result in a reduction in the unemployment rate for the workers who are competent in
input production, while the unemployment rate of the remaining workers remains unchanged. Overall unemployment
rate can decline as a result.
27See the survey by Helpman (2006). Also, see Mitra and Ranjan (2008) for an explcit modeling of incomplete
contracts, in the context of external economies of o¤shoring (but not in the context of unemployment).
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, in order to study the impact of o¤shoring on sectoral and economywide rates of
unemployment, we construct a two sector general equilibrium model in which unemployment is
caused by search frictions. We nd that, contrary to general perception, wage increases and sec-
toral unemployment decreases due to o¤shoring. This result can be understood to arise from the
productivity enhancing (cost reducing) e¤ect of o¤shoring. This result is consistent with the recent
empirical results of Amiti and Wei (2005a, b) for the US and UK, where, when sectors are dened
broadly enough, they nd no evidence of a negative e¤ect of o¤shoring on sectoral employment.
Even though both sectors have lower unemployment post-o¤shoring, whether the sector with
the lower unemployment or higher unemployment expands will also be a determinant of the overall
unemployment rate. If the search cost is identical in the two sectors, implying identical rates of un-
employment, then the economywide rate of unemployment declines unambiguously after o¤shoring.
Alternatively, even if the search cost is higher in the sector which experiences o¤shoring (implying
a higher wage as well as higher rate of unemployment in that sector), the economywide rate of
unemployment decreases because workers move from the higher unemployment sector to the lower
unemployment sector.
When we modify the model to disallow intersectoral labor mobility, the negative relative price
e¤ect on the sector in which rms o¤shore some of their production activity becomes stronger. In
such a case, it is possible for this e¤ect to o¤set the positive productivity e¤ect, and result in a rise
in unemployment in that sector. In the other sector, o¤shoring has a much stronger unemployment
reducing e¤ect in the absence of intersectoral labor mobility than in the presence of it.
We can also point out the welfare implications of o¤shoring in our model. Since wages are
expressed in terms of the numeraire consumption good, the welfare implications of o¤shoring are
straightforward. As we have shown that wage increases and the economywide unemployment de-
creases (when cx  cz) due to o¤shoring, the impact on welfare is positive.
We also work out the comparative static results of changing some of the parameters representing
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labor market institutions. We nd that the e¤ect of an increase in labor market frictions or rigidities
on o¤shoring depends on the nature of the friction or rigidity being considered as well as the relative
size of the vacancy costs in the two sectors. Under the more likely case that vacancy costs are
higher in the Z sector than in the X sector, o¤shoring becomes more likely with a reduction in the
unemployment benets, the bargaining power of workers and e¢ ciency in matching and an increase
in the vacancy cost in sector Z and the common job destruction rate across the two sectors.
There are two main messages from the paper. Firstly, how o¤shoring will a¤ect unemployment
will depend on the alternative opportunities available for the type of labor whose jobs have been
o¤shored. If these workers can freely start searching for alternative jobs, we see a reduction in
the unemployment rates for all types of workers. These alternative jobs can be in the same sector
(such as more headquarter jobs in our model) or in another sector (such as X-sector jobs in our
model). Secondly, with impediments to movements across sectors and across jobs, the likelihood
of unemployment for some workers goes up as a result of o¤shoring. However, the unemployment
rates for all types of workers will never go up at the same time as a result of o¤shoring.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Maximization problem of the rm in the autarky case
The rm maximizes (8) subject to (7), and (6). Denoting the Lagrangian multiplier associated
with (7) by , and with (6) by ; the current value Hamiltonian for each rm can be written as
H = Pz
1
  (1  )1 m

hm
1 
p   wzN   czV + [q(z)V   N ]
+[N  mh  mp]
The rst order conditions for the above maximization are follows.
mh :
Pzm
 1
h m
1 
p
  (1  )1  =  (21)
mp :
Pz(1  )mhm p
  (1  )1  =  (22)
V : cz = q(z) (23)
N : wz +     =
:
  r (24)
Now, (21) and (22) imply
mh
mp
=

1   (25)
using the above in (21) gives
Pz =  (26)
Next, note from (23) that for a given z,  is constant. Using
:
 = 0; (23), and (26) in (24) we get
PZ   wz = (r + ) =
(r + )cz
q(z)
(27)
 is the shadow value of an extra job.
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7.2 Wage Determination
Let Uz denote the income of the unemployed in the Z sector, the asset value equation for the
unemployed in this sector is given by
rUz = b+ zq(z)[Ez   Uz] (28)
where Ez is the expected income from becoming employed in the Z sector. As explained in Pis-
sarides (2000), the asset that is valued is an unemployed workers human capital. The return on
this asset is the unemployment benet b plus the expected capital gain from the possible change in
state from unemployed to employed given by zq(z)[Ez   Uz]:
The asset value equation for an employed worker in sector Z is given by
rEz = wz + (Uz   Ez)) Ez =
wz
r + 
+
Uz
r + 
(29)
Again the return on being employed equals the wage plus the expected change in the asset value
from a change in state from employed to unemployed. Assume the rent from a vacant job to be zero
which is ensured by no barriers to the posting of vacancy. Now, denote the surplus for a rm from
an occupied job by Jz. Since the wage is determined using Nash bargaining where the bargaining
weights are  and 1  ; we get the following wage bargaining equation:
Ez   Uz = (Jz + Ez   Uz) (30)
The above implies that
Ez   Uz =

1  Jz =

1  
cz
q(z)
(31)
where the last equality follows from the fact that the value of an occupied job, Jz; equals czq(z)
as shown in (11). Plugging the value of Ez   Uz from above into the asset value equation for the
unemployed in (28) we have a simplied version of this asset value equation
rUz = b+

1   czz (32)
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Next, (29) implies that
Ez   Uz =
wz
r + 
  rUz
r + 
(33)
Use (31) to substitute out Ez   Uz and (32) to substitute out rUz in the above expression to get
the following simplied wage equation:
wz = b+
cz
1   [z +
r + 
q(z)
]
Similarly, in the case of the X sector, we obtain wx = b+
cx
1  [x +
r+
q(x)
]:
7.3 Sectoral reallocation of labor after o¤shoring
Claim: When C = 1
(1 )1 Z
X1  and cx = cz; the labor force in the Z sector is smaller in an
o¤shoring equilibrium than in autarky.
Proof: Note that the relative demand (4) when (2) is Cobb-Douglas is given by
Z
X
d
=
Px
(1  )Pz
(34)
The relative demand for Z equal to relative supply in autarky equilibrium can be written as
Lz
L  Lz
=
(1  ux)Px
(1  )(1  uz)Pz
(35)
Next, cx = cz implies x = z, which in turn implies wx = wz; and hence Px = Pz: Now, the choice
of numeraire implies Px = Pz = 1. Also, x = z implies ux = uz. Therefore, from (35)
Lz
L  Lz
=

1  
Let LAz denote the size of the labor force in the Z sector in the no-o¤shoring equilibrium. The
above expression implies that LAz = L:
Similarly, the relative demand equals relative supply in the o¤shoring equilibrium can be written
as
Lz
L  Lz
=
(1  ux)! 1Px
(1  )(1  uz)Pz
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Again, cx = cz implies x = z and hence ux = uz: Also, PzPx = !
 1: Therefore, the above becomes
Lz
L  Lz
=

1  
Denoting the equilibrium Lz in the case of o¤shoring by LOz ; from above we get
LOz =

1   +  L
Therefore, LOz < L
A
z for any  < 1: QED
The number of workers displaced from Z sector as a result of o¤shoring is LAz  LOz =
(1 )(1 )
(1 +) L
7.4 Multilateral Wage Bargaining
Following Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman (2007), we study multilateral Shapley bargaining be-
tweeen the rm and the various workers that are being employed by the rm. In a bargaining
game with a nite number of players, each players Shapley value is the average of her contributions
to all coalitions that consist of players ordered below her in all feasible permutations." (Acemoglu,
Antras and Helpman, 2007). The set of players here are the rm and the workers. In any of these
coalitions, if the rm itself is ordered below a worker, then the marginal contribution of this worker
is her value of marginal product, while if the rm is ordered after her, the marginal contribution
of this worker to the coalition of workers preceding her in the ordering is just the unemployment
benet that she receives. We are going to assume that in autarky if the rm precedes a worker
in the ordering, the value of a workers marginal product is going to be calculated assuming that
the rm is able to optimally divide the existing labor in the coalition into headquarter workers
and production workers. Since all these workers are being drawn from the same labor force, the
labor costs and the wage rate associated with each of them will be identical. We apply directly
the Acemoglu-Antras-Helpman approach to the calculation of Shapley values for a continuum of
players, the total measure of which in our model equals N:28 A worker that has a measure n of
28Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman (2007) derive their approach to computing the Shapley value for a continuum of
players from the original approach for a discrete number of players.
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players before her in the sequence will with probability n=N have the rm before her and will have
the rm after her with probability 1   n=N . Therefore her expected marginal contribution with
position n in the sequence is (n=N)Pz+(1 n=N)rUz; where Uz is the asset value of an unemployed
worker. Integrating over all n and taking the average we have the Shapley value of a worker under
autarky as the following:
S =
1
N
NZ
0
[(n=N)Pz + (1  n=N)b] dn =
1
2
Pz +
1
2
rUz
In other words, under this type of bargaining the revenue R is distributed between workers and
the rm, with workers getting R=2 +NrUz=2 and the rm getting R=2 NrUz=2: Foreseeing this
outcome of the wage bargaining problem, the rm now maximizesZ 1
t
e r(s t)

1
2
PzZ  NrUz=2  czV

ds
in the rst stage subject to exactly the constraints we mention in the text. This maximization
problem gives us in the steady state Pz =

b+ 2(r+)czq(z)

; which when plugged into the Shapley
value gives us
S = wz = rUz +
(r + )cz
q(z)
(36)
This in turn, along with Pz =

rUz +
2(r+)cz
q(z)

; implies that we still have
Pz =

wz +
(r + )cz
q(z)

Note from (33) and (31) in the text that the expression for bargained wage is
wz = rUz +

1  
(r + )cz
q(z)
Therefore, for  = 1=2; the Shapley value of a worker is exactly the same as the wage obtained
using Nash bargaining in the text.
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Under o¤shoring, let us assume that the rm comes in with the entire amount of input (i.e., it
has already bought or placed an order for the entire quantity of the imported input it needs). In
this case, the Shapley value becomes
S =
1
N
NZ
0

(n=N)Pz
1
  (1  )1  n
 1m1 p + (1  n=N)rUz

dn
=

1 + 
Pz
1
  (1  )1 N
 1m1 p +
1
2
rUz =
R=N
1 + 
+
1
2
rUz
In this case, the rm gets R+1  
1
2NrUz: The rm then maximizesZ 1
t
e r(s t)

1
1 + 
PzZ  NrUz=2  wsmp   czV

ds
in the rst stage subject to the constraints mentioned in the main text. Therefore, we have
Pz = (1 + )

rUz
2
+
(r + )cz
q(z)

w1 s and mp = N

rUz
2 +
(r+)cz
q(z)

ws
1  

Plugging these equations into the expression for our Shapley value we have
S = wz = rUz +
(r + )cz
q(z)
which is exactly the same as the Shapley value obtained under autarky. Therefore, the qualitative
results are unchanged.
7.5 Comparing autarky and O¤shoring supply curves without intersectoral la-
bor mobility
Start with any relative price PzPx : At the corresponding Px, the unemployment and wage in sector
X are the same under o¤shoring as in the case of autarky at the same price. In sector Z, at
the corresponding Pz the corresponding

wz +
(r+)cz
q(z)

; determined by (19) now, is higher in the
o¤shoring case because ws is lower than the cost of domestic labor. Note from (20) that wz and z
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are positively related. Therefore, for every Pz; z must be higher in the o¤shoring case implying a
lower unemployment in the Z sector. The relative supply of Z is given by
Z
X
=
1
  (1  )1 
N m1 p
(1  ux)Lx
Next, note that mp =
N(1 )

wz+
(r+)cz
q(z)

ws
; and therefore,
Z
X
=
N!1 
(1  ux)Lx
(37)
Now, compared to the autarky case, at each Pz, N(= (1   uz)Lz) is higher because uz is lower.
Also, ! > 1 and  < 1; therefore, the o¤shoring ZX is higher. Hence, the short run relative
supply, SRSO(LAz ), in the o¤shoring case lies to the right of the one in the autarky case shown by
SRSA(LAz ) in Figure 3.
7.6 Comparative statics with respect to b;  and ci
When b goes up, the average cost of employing domestic labor in sectorX, given by

wx +
(r+)cx
q(x)

;
remains unchanged for a given Px: In the (w; ) space, the downward sloping curve representing the
autarky job creation (JC) equation, Px =

wx +
(r+)cx
q(x)

remains unchanged. The upward sloping
wage curve (WC) representing wx = b +
cx
1  [x +
r+
q(x)
] shifts towards a higher wx for any given
x:Given the downward sloping nature of the JC curve, the intersection of the JC and WC curves
now implies a higher wage and lower labor-market tightness in sector X: We are now interested in
seeing what happens under autarky to the NAC curve, i.e., what happens to Pz for a given Px as b
increases. Plugging in the WC equation into the JC equation in each of the sectors and imposing
the labor mobility condition; cxx = czz; we can write Pz   Px = r+1 
h
cz
q(z)
  cxq(x)
i
: Using a
Cobb-Douglas matching function, m(vi; ui) = v

i u
1 
i ; we have q(i) = 
 1
i ; imposing which we
now have Pz   Px = r+(1 )
h
cz
cx

  1
i
cx
1 
x ; which is increasing in x if cz > cx , decreasing in
x if cz < cx and invariant to x if cz = cx : Since x goes down as a result of an increase in b for a
given Px, the NAC curve shifts up (and Pz goes up) when cz < cx , NAC curve shifts down (and
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Pz goes down) when cz > cx and NAC remains unmoved (and Pz is unchanged) as a 45 degree line
if cz = cx:
Using very similar logic and in addition noting that Pz   Px = r+(1 )
h
cz
cx

  1
i
cx
1 
x is
directly increasing in  for given search costs and labor-market tightness, it is clear that for cz < cx;
o¤shoring becomes more likely with an increase in : And because of the direct e¤ect of ; there is
ambiguity here when cz > cx:
Finally an increase in cz clearly shifts the NAC curve up and leads to o¤shoring, at which point
there is a downward jump in sectoral unemployment.
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